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Legal Instruments for the Liberalization of
Trade in Services at the Sub-Regional Level:
The MERCOSUR Case*
Gabriel Gari**
Abstract
With the recent entry into force of the Protocol of Montevideo on
Trade in Services, the MERCOSUR legal system includes three main
instruments for the liberalization of trade in services: a number of
general obligations and disciplines that prescribe minimum standards of
treatment for foreign services and service providers, a Program of
Liberalization based on the negotiation of specific concessions on
Market Access and National Treatment and a rule-making process for the
adoption of secondary legislation on specific service sectors. This article
assesses the impact these instruments may have on the liberalization of
trade in services and suggests ways to enhance their efficacy and to
foster Members' compliance with MERCOSUR disciplines on services
within the limits of MERCOSUR's strictly intergovernmental approach
to integration. It is argued that there is room for improvement in this
area, which could potentially facilitate the movement of services and
service providers within the bloc without resorting to major institutional
reforms based on a supranational model of integration. At the same time,
it is argued that MERCOSUR Members' lukewarm commitment to the
integration process will make it difficult to achieve significant results any
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time soon. In any event, considering the particularities of barriers to
trade in services, this article contends that the success of any strategy for
the liberalization of trade in services ultimately will be conditioned to the
improvement of the transparency, economic efficiency, impartiality and
due process of domestic regulatory practices.
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Introduction

On March 26, 1991, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay
signed a treaty in Asunci6n for the establishment of a common market
involving the free movement of goods, services and factors of
production, named MERCOSUR.I The Treaty of Asunci6n, as it became
to be known, set a five year period for the establishment of the common
market but fell short in laying down the rules and institutions necessary
to accomplish the ambitious goal in such a brief period of time. The
Treaty only stipulates broadly defined commitments2 and a minimalist
and strictly intergovernmental institutional structure.
Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Asunci6n, the
liberalization of trade in goods took priority over the liberalization of
trade in services, and it is not difficult to understand why this occurred.
MERCOSUR trade was mainly based on goods, while the liberalization
of trade in services raised complex and sensitive issues, which trade
negotiators were not ready to address, mainly due to lack of political will
and technical expertise. Notwithstanding these initial difficulties, a
number of measures aimed at the liberalization of trade in services have
been adopted since the very beginning of the integration process.
Fifteen years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Asunci6n,
the state of affairs on the free movement of services and service
providers in MERCOSUR remains closer to an expression of will than to
a legal and economic reality. 3 The fragmentation between domestic
services markets contrasts with recent technological developments that
have dramatically reduced the transaction costs of trade in services,
creating fresh business opportunities in sectors that no long ago where
regarded as non-tradable. At a time of growing importance of services
for both developed and developing economies, the cost of not having an
open, sound and transparent regulatory framework for the free movement

1. See Tratado para la Constituci6n de un Mercado Comun entre la Rep6blica

Argentina, la Repblica Federativa del Brasil, la Rep-dblica del Paraguay y la RepOlblica
Oriental del Uruguay Arg.-Braz.-Para.-Uru., Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041 [hereinafter
Treaty of Asunci6n]. The Treaty of Asunci6n entered into force on November 29, 1991.
MERCOSUR is the Spanish acronym for the Common Market of the South.
2. Except for the Trade Liberalisation Programme included in Annex I to the
Treaty, which stipulates detailed obligations for the removal of tariffs according to a
gradual, lineal and automatic schedule.
3. See, e.g., Gabriel Gari, Free Circulation of Services in Mercosur: A Pending
Task, 10 LAW & Bus. REV. AM. 545 (2004); Marcio de Oliveira Junior, Uma An6lise Da
Liberalizaqdo do Com&cio Internacional de Serviqos no MERCOSUL, Texto Para

Discussdo N' 727, (Institudo de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada, Working Paper No. 727,
2000) availableat http://www.ipea.gov.br/pub/td/td_2000/td0727.pdf; CARLOS ALBERTO
PRIMO BRAGA & JULIO DE BRUM, SERVICES IN MERCOSUR: MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING?

(1995).
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of services and service providers within the bloc cannot be overlooked.
In December 2005, the Protocol of Montevideo on Trade in
Services-a GATS-like instrument4 -providing a regulatory framework
for trade in services in MERCOSUR, finally entered into force.5 The
event has been overlooked by MERCOSUR scholarship, traditionally
focused on trade in goods 6 and overshadowed by an acrimonious debate
over the current status of the integration process, which in the eyes of the
smaller partners has allegedly failed to meet the expectations it once
raised. The purpose of this article is to draw the attention away from the
mainstream debate and focus on MERCOSUR's main legal instruments
for the liberalization of trade in services.
The Protocol of Montevideo includes general obligations
prescribing the minimum standards of treatment that Member States
must accord to foreign services and service providers and regulatory
disciplines that Member States must observe when adopting measures
affecting trade in services. It also compels Member States to participate
in a Program of Liberalization based on rounds of negotiations of
specific commitments on Market Access and National Treatment. In
addition, Member States may adopt secondary legislation for the
regulation of specific service sectors. This article examines each of these
legal instruments, assesses the impact they may have on the liberalization
of trade in services in MERCOSUR, and puts forward some proposals to
enhance their efficacy and to foster Members' compliance with
MERCOSUR disciplines on services.

4. See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1168
[hereinafter GATS].
5. See Protocolo de Montevideo sobre el Comercio de Servicios del Mercosur
[Protocol of Montevideo on Trade in Services in MERCOSUR] [hereinafter Protocol of
Montevideo], approved by MERCOSUR Decision 13/97, (Dec. 15 1997). The Protocol
entered into force on Dec. 7, 2005. So far the Protocol has been ratified by Argentina
(Ley 25623, July 17, 2002, published by the Official Bulletin Aug.8, 2002), Brazil
(Decreto Legislativo 335/2003, July 24, 2003 and Decreto Legislativo 926/2005, Sept.
15, 2005) and Uruguay (Ley 17885, Dec. 20, 2004). According to Article XXVII, when
three countries deposit the ratification instruments before the Paraguayan Government,
the Protocol will enter into force. This occurred on Dec. 7, 2005.
6. There are very few commentaries on MERCOSUR law on services. See Felix
Pena, El Comercio de Servicios en el MERCOSUR, BOLETIN MERCOSUR FUNDACION
BANK BOSTON 49 (1998); Maria-Angelica Pefia, Services in MERCOSUR: The Protocol
of Montevideo, in SERVICES TRADE IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 154 (Sherry M.
Stephenson ed., 2000); ROBERTO Ruiz DiAz LABRANO, MERCOSUR: INTEGRACI6N Y
DERECHO 336-348 (1998); Luis Alejandro Estoup, La Liberaci6n De La Prestaci6n De
Servicios en el Mercosur,DERECHO MERCANTIL CONTEMPORANEO 163 (2001).
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Trade Barriers

"Trade barriers" are usually associated with measures exclusively
addressed against foreign goods, imposed at the border and deliberately
adopted to protect domestic industries from foreign competition, such as
tariffs or quotas. However, the scope of measures that can restrict crossborder trade is much broader than that.
Cross-border trade may be hindered by "within-the-border" barriers,
namely, discriminatory measures deliberately adopted against foreign
products in respect of taxation, distribution, advertising or marketing
conditions, to name just a few.
Cross-border trade may also be hindered by governmental measures
and practices, which, although not primarily aimed at protecting
domestic industries from foreign competition, have trade-restrictive
effects. The mere difference between the exporting and the importing
country regulations in terms of health and safety standards, technical
standards or consumer protection, places a dual regulatory burden on the
exporter, which increases the transaction costs of international sales and
discourages trade. This type of trade restriction is not the result of a
deliberate effort to protect domestic industries, but the mere expression
of different policy choices, values and standards of living.
Private actors can also hinder the free movement of goods or
services across national borders. Business practices such as price-fixing,
market sharing, concerted refusal to purchase, or exclusive dealing
arrangements that make it difficult for new goods and services to "break
into" established business channels, restrain competition and thereby
restrict trade.
Furthermore, there are a number of other factors, which cannot be
directly attributed to particular governmental or private conducts that
have trade-restrictive effects, most notably, unstable macroeconomic
conditions and, in particular, volatile exchange rates. Arguably, any
factor preventing goods and services from flowing across national
borders in the same way as they flow within an internal market could be
labeled as a trade barrier. However, such a broad definition includes
trade restrictions that would remain beyond the reach of the disciplining
effect of international trade rules.
For the purpose of this article, "trade barriers" refers to
governmental measures7 and practices 8 that restrict foreign goods' or
7. Governmental measures include any kind of laws, regulations or administrative
decisions taken by government agencies or non-governmental bodies in the exercise of
powers delegated by government agencies.
8. Governmental practices refer to the way domestic regulations are applied and
enforced by the competent authorities.
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services' access to domestic markets or impair the competitive
relationship between foreign goods or services vis A vis like domestic
goods and services within the domestic market, irrespective of whether
they have been adopted with a view to protect domestic industries or
not. 9
Trade in services, like trade in goods, can be hindered either by
governmental measures and practices that restrict foreign services' or
foreign service providers' access to the domestic market and by
governmental measures and practices that impair the competitive
relationship between foreign services vis-it-vis like domestic services
within the domestic market. However, because of the particularities of
trade in services, 10 there are significant differences between barriers to
trade in services and barriers to trade in goods.1 1
First, contrary to tariffs and quotas, which are clearly identifiable,
explicitly protectionist and whose trade-restrictive effect is easily

9. There are many official reports, updated on a regular basis, which provide a
useful insight on the variety of governmental measures and practices with traderestrictive effects. See, e.g., WTO Trade Policy Reviews, http://www.wto.org/english/
tratope/tpr.e/tpr_e.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2007). Large trading nations also conduct
regular investigations on trade barriers applied by their trading partners to their exports.
For U.S. reports, see Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2005 National
Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (Mar. 30, 2005),
http://www.ustr.gov/Document -Library/Reports -Publications/2005/2005-NTE-Report/S
ection-Index.html?ht=. For the E.U., see European Commission, European Community
Report on United States Barriers to Trade and Investment 2005, http://tradeinfo.cec.eu.int/doclib/docs/2006.
10. For an excellent account of the particularities of transactions on services as
compared to transactions on goods see T.P. Hill, On Goods and Services, 43 REV.
INCOME & WEALTH 315-338 (1977). Hill's seminal work alerted the academia about the
complexity underlying the nature of services, and served as a springboard for further
research in this area. See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, Splintering and Disembodiment of
Services and Developing Nations, 7 WORLD ECON. 133-43 (1984); GERTJAN LINDERS,
THEORY, METHODOLOGY AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON SERVICES AND SERVICES TRADE
(2001); R. MCCULLOCH, THE HAGUE: NETHERLANDS BUREAU FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
ANALYSIS (1987); Andr&Sapir, & Chantal Winter, InternationalCompetition in Services,
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 2204, 1994); Services Trade in
SURVEYS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (David Greenaway & L. Alan Winters eds., 1994);
JOACHIM STIBORA & ALBERT DE VAAL, SERVICES AND SERVICES TRADE: A THEORETICAL
INQUIRY (1995).
11. For studies on barriers on trade in services see UNITED NATIONS
CEPAL/ECLAC, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT FINANCE DIVISION,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNIT, MANUAL FOR COMPLETING THE QUESTIONNAIRE ON
MEASURES AFFECTING SERVICES TRADE IN THE HEMISPHERE ECLAC (2000); BERNARD
HOEKMAN & CARLOS ALBERTO PRIMO BRAGA, PROTECTION AND TRADE IN SERVICES: A
SURVEY (1997); Bernard Hoekman, Conceptual and Political Economy Issues in
LiberalizingInternationalTransactionsin SERVICES IN ANALYTICAL NEGOTIATING ISSUES
INTHE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM (Alan Deardorff & Robert. M. Stem eds., 1994); Gary
P. Sampson & Richard H. Snape, Identifying the Issues in Trade in Services, 8 WORLD
ECON. 171-81 (1984).
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measurable, most barriers to trade in services are embedded in domestic
regulations scattered all over the regulatory system, which do not
necessarily pursue an explicit protectionist purpose and whose traderestrictive effect is difficult to measure.
Second, trade in services frequently involves the cross-border
movement of factors of production. Therefore, governmental measures
and practices that directly or indirectly have a restrictive effect on the
cross-border movement of persons, capital and information, including,
amongst others, immigration policies, cultural policies, balance of
payment policies and foreign direct investment policies have,
accordingly, a restrictive effect on trade in services.
Third, service markets are more heavily regulated than merchandise
markets. As a result, foreign services and foreign service providers face
a higher risk than foreign goods of being subject to discriminatory
Moreover, pervasive State intervention in
measures and practices.
service markets-not only as a regulator but also as a service provider
and as a service consumer-is more likely to affect the level playing
field for foreign service providers vis A vis domestic providers.
Finally, a number of domestic regulations with restrictive effects on
trade in services touch upon a number of sensitive public policy issues,
increasing the usual tension between free trade and non-trade concerns
that underlies the liberalization of merchandise trade.
The particularities of barriers to trade in services have some policy
implications for the liberalization of trade in services. First, the political
will to liberalize must be particularly strong to counteract protectionist
reactions against the opening of service markets to foreign competition.
Second, the scope of application of trade disciplines must be particularly
broad, tackling not only overt quantitative restrictions or discriminatory
measures against foreign service providers, but also measures that may
directly or indirectly affect trade in services, including, amongst others,
measures affecting the cross border movement of persons, capital and
information. Third, trade disciplines must include not only minimum
standards of treatment that Member States must accord to foreign service
providers (e.g., Market Access and National Treatment), but also
regulatory disciplines that Member States must observe when adopting
measures affecting trade in services (e.g., transparency, reasonableness,
Finally, sophisticated
objectivity, impartiality and due process).
institutional mechanisms for the further development of trade disciplines
and their enforcement must be in place.
B.

Trade Liberalization
Just like trade barriers cannot be limited to tariffs and quotas, trade
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liberalization cannot be confined to the removal of clear-cut protectionist
measures either. On the contrary, trade liberalization is a complex
process that requires a subtle combination of different type of actions:
removing existing barriers and preventing new ones to emerge,12
deregulating domestic rules and re-regulating at the "supranational"
level.
Broadly speaking, trade liberalization refers to a process of
interstate cooperation laid down by an international trade agreement
aimed at disciplining governmental measures and practices that restrict
foreign goods' or services' access to domestic markets or impair the
competitive relationship between foreign goods or services vis-A-vis like
domestic goods and services. The liberalization process is unfolded
under the umbrella of a treaty, which accords rights and imposes
obligations to its parties. The degree of liberalization sought varies from
treaty to treaty and so does the spectrum of governmental areas subject to
international disciplines, the rules and principles Member States are
subject to, and the type of institutional framework established for the
implementation and, eventually, the enforcement of those rules and
principles.
The economic literature on international trade usually refers to two
main modalities of trade liberalization, namely, "negative integration"
and "positive integration." For Tinbergen, for example, "negative
integration" means the removal of discrimination and restrictions on
trade and "positive integration" means the creation of new institutions
and their instruments or the modification of existing instruments, so as to
enable the market of the integrated area to function13 effectively and to
promote other broader policy objectives in the union.
Legal scholars adopted a similar terminology to reflect the different
type of legal instruments used for advancing the trade liberalization
process. On European law, for instance, Weatherhill differentiates
"negative harmonization," which he understands as the elimination of
obstructive national laws through judicial rulings, from "positive or
legislative harmonization," by which he refers to the introduction of
community rules to govern a particular area in partial or total
replacement for national rules. 14 Similarly, Ziller argues for the need to

12. The term "supranational" is hereby used in a loose sense to refer to norms
adopted by treaty-based decision-making bodies and does not necessarily imply the
existence of a qualified majority decision-making system or the direct effect, direct
applicability or primacy of the supranational norm.
13. See JAN TINBERGEN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (1956).
14. See Stephen Weatherhill, Why Harmonise? in EUROPEAN UNION LAW FOR THE
21 s CENTURY: RETHINKING THE NEW LEGAL ORDER, VOL 11 12 (Takis Tridimas & Paolisa
Nebbia eds., 2004).
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complement the abolishment of barriers to the movement of goods,
services, labor and capital, necessary to set up the common market, with
more sophisticated forms of regulation necessary to manage the market
once it is set up, "both because of the recurrent temptations of
governments to restore protectionism, and because market failures have
to be corrected by regulatory intervention." 1 5 The literature on WTO law
also refers to negative and positive integration. 16
The variety of bodies involved and legal instruments used for the
liberalization of trade reveals the intricate nature of this process, quite
different from the lay understanding about trade liberalization merely as
a diplomatic-led process based on negotiations aimed at the removal of
tariffs or the de-regulation of national markets.
C.

Trade Liberalizationof Services in MERCOSUR

Article 1 of the Treaty of Asunci6n contains the core legal provision
on the liberalization of intra regional trade. It provides for the
establishment of a common market by December 31, 1994, which shall
involve, amongst other things:
The free movement of goods, services and factors of production
between countries through, inter alia, the elimination of customs
on the movement of goods, and any
duties and non-tariff restrictions
17

other equivalent measures[.]

At the beginning of 1994, MERCOSUR Members realized the original
target to have a common market in place by the end of that year was far
too ambitious and decided to redefine the objectives of the integration
process. They agreed to establish a customs union as an essential step
that should be taken before starting a new stage towards the formation of
a common market. 18 As a result, MERCOSUR Members prioritized the
15. See Jacques Ziller, The Challenge of Governance in Regional Integration. Key
Experiencesfrom Europe 36-37 (European Union Institute Working Paper, 2005).
16. See, e.g., Ernst Ulrsich Petersmann, From 'Negative' to 'Positive' Integration in
the WTO: Time for 'MainstreamingHuman Rights' into WTO Law?, 37 C.M. L. REv

1363 (2000); Thomas Cottier and Petros Mavroidis, Regulatory Barriers and the
Principle of Non-Discrimination in WTO Law: An Overview, in REGULATORY BARRIERS
AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION LAW 4

(Thomas Cottier, Petros Mavroidis and Patrick Blatter eds., 2000); Jacques H.J.
Bourgeois, On the Internal Morality of WTO Law, in EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND
INTERNATIONAL

CO-ORDINATION-STUDIES

IN

TRANSNATIONAL

ECONOMIC

LAW

IN

HONOUR OF CLAUS-DIETER EHLERMANN 40 (Armin von Bogandy, Petros Mavroidis &

Yves M~ny eds., 2002).
17. THE MERCOSUR CODES (Marta Haines Ferrari, trans., BIICL 2000). The original
text is in Spanish and Portuguese.
18. See MERCOSUR CMC Decision 13/93, (Jan. 17, 1994) (approving the
"Consolidation of the Customs Union and Transition to a Common Market" schedule).
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implementation of a common external tariff and the elimination of
tariffs' 9 and non-tariff barriers to intra regional trade in goods, while
leaving their commitments on the other aspects of a common market
such as the coordination of macroeconomic policies and the free
movement of services and factors of production loosely defined, with no
implementation deadline attached to them.
Despite not being regarded as a priority, MERCOSUR bodies began
to work on the liberalization of trade in services during the early stages
of the integration process. In June 1992, the Common Market Council
("CMC") approved a broad and ambitious working program containing a
variety of tasks for the establishment of a common market to be
concluded by the end of 1994 .20 A number of those tasks were aimed at
advancing the liberalization of trade in services either by way of
negotiating general obligations and disciplines or by way of harmonizing
legislation or adopting mutual recognition agreements for specific
service sectors.
The working program assigned a Commission on Trade in Services
created under the umbrella of sub-working group No. 10-Coordination
of Macroeconomic Policies-the task of reviewing the domestic legal
systems of each Member State and proposing a framework agreement for
the regulation of trade in services by December 1993. Despite the efforts
made, the agreement was not completed on time. The commission's
mandate was renewed and its institutional status upgraded, first to an Ad
Hoc Group on Services and then to a Group on Services accountable to
the Common Market Group ("CMG"). 21 However, it was not until
November 1997 that a framework agreement on trade in services was
adopted. Seven additional months were necessary for completing the
drafting of the sectoral annexes to the Protocol and for the negotiation of
State Parties' initial schedules of specific commitments.22 One reason
put forward by MERCOSUR diplomats to explain the delay in reaching
an agreement was the novelty of the issue and the lack of experience on
how to deal with it. 23 Because of delays on the ratification process in

19. See MERCOSUR CMC Decision 5/94, (Aug. 5, 1994); MERCOSUR CMC
Decision 24/94, (Dec. 17, 1994).
20. See MERCOSUR CMC Decision 1/92, (June 27, 1992) (establishing a working
programme known as Las Lenas Programme).
21. See MERCOSUR CMG Resolution 38/95, (Dec. 4, 1995) (creating the Ad Hoc
Group on Services); see MERCOSUR CMG Resolution 31/98, (July 23, 1998) (creating
the Group of Services).
22. See CMC Decision 09/98, July 23, 1998
23. See comments made in 1996 by Mario Antonio Marconini, Ad Hoc Group on
Services' Coordinator. Mario Antonio Marconini, Estado Actual de Las Negociaciones
en Materia de Comercio de Servicios en el Mercosur, ACTAS CONFERENCIA ORIGEN EN EL
COMERCIO DE SERVICIOS 63 (1996).
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each Member State, it was not until December 7, 2005 that the Protocol
finally entered into force.2 4

The Protocol of Montevideo constitutes an integral part of the
Treaty of Asunci6n and is based on the GATS. Except for a few
exceptions, the Protocol literally transposes into the sub-regional context
the provisions of this multilateral instrument. Part II of the Protocol
includes general obligations that prescribe the minimum standards of
treatment that Member States must accord to foreign services and service
providers (e.g., Most Favored Nation Treatment, Market Access and
National Treatment) and regulatory disciplines that Member States must
observe when adopting measures affecting trade in services (e.g.,
transparency, reasonableness, objectivity and impartiality). Part III of
the Protocol sets out the conditions for a Program of Liberalization of
trade in services based on the negotiation of specific commitments. In
addition to the Protocol, the MERCOSUR legal system includes a rulemaking process for the adoption of secondary legislation. So far, a
number of Decisions and Resolutions aimed at the harmonization or
mutual recognition of domestic legislation have been enacted. Sections
II, III and IV of this article examine in further detail each of these legal
instruments for the liberalization of trade in services.
II.

General Obligations and Disciplines on Trade in Services

A.

The Scope of Application of the ProtocolofMontevideo

General obligations and disciplines included in trade agreements
further the liberalization of trade in services by compelling Member
States to accord foreign services and service providers minimum
standards of treatment and to regulate in a more "trade friendly" way,
fostering more open, transparent and non-discriminatory domestic laws.25
MERCOSUR Members are subject to the general obligations and
disciplines contained in Part II of the Protocol of Montevideo on Trade in
Services, which, as it has been mentioned, largely reproduces those
general obligations and disciplines included in the GATS.
In principle, the scope of application of the Protocol of Montevideo
is defined broadly. Article 11.1 prescribes that the Protocol applies "to
measures taken by Member States which affect trade in services. . .

."

In

turn, Article 11.2 defines "trade in services" as the supply of a service:
24. See Protocol of Montevideo, supra note 6.
25. It is important to bear in mind that the obligations and disciplines may either be
expressly stated by Treaty provisions or implied by them. In this sense, the adjudicatory
bodies responsible for interpreting the Treaty play a critical role in shaping the normative
content of those obligations and disciplines.
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(a) from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other
Member;
(b) in the territory of one Member to the service consumer of any
other Member;
(c) by a service supplier of one Member,26 through commercial
presence in the territory of any other Member;
(d) by a service supplier of one Member, through presence of natural
persons of a Member in the territory of any other Member.

However, further provisions of the Protocol and its Annexes introduce
significant limitations to this initially broad scope of application. First,
the Protocol does not apply to services provided in the exercise of
governmental authority.2 7 Second, both the Annex on Air Transport
Services and the Annex on Land and Waterway Transport Services
exclude from the Protocol's scope of application the rights and
obligations included in sector-specific agreements concluded before the
Protocol was approved.28 Third, the Annex on the Movement of Natural
Persons introduces important caveats to the type of measures relating to
Finally, and most
this mode of supply that can be disciplined.
importantly, the two main standards of treatment that must be accorded
to foreign services and service providers-National Treatment and
Market Access-are binding only in those service sectors included in
Member States' schedules of specific commitments and subject to the
restrictions thereby applied to each mode of supply.

26. The inclusion of commercial presence as a modality of "trade" in services defies
the ordinary meaning of "trade." While "trade" refers to arms-length transactions
between buyers and sellers, the commercial presence mode of supply implies the
permanent presence of the foreign service supplier in the territory of the consumers'
country. For many service sectors, commercial presence is the only way to compete in
foreign markets, but at the time the GATS was negotiated there was no support for the
liberalization of foreign direct investment at the multilateral level. To circumvent that
obstacle, GATS negotiators agreed on an extraordinary broad definition of trade in
services, encompassing the supply of services through the commercial presence of
foreign service providers.
27. See Protocol of Montevideo, supra note 6, arts. 1l.3(b), (c).
28. See id., Air Transport Services, Annex, arts. 2- 4; see id., Land and Waterway
Transport Services, Annex, arts. 2,3.
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The General Obligations and DisciplinesIncluded in the Protocol
1.

Most Favored Nation Treatment

According to the most favored nation treatment ("MFN"), whatever
the conditions of treatment accorded to services or service providers
from a Member State, they shall be immediately and unconditionally
accorded to like services or service providers from any other Member
State.29
This obligation is very important in the multilateral context in order
to discipline an extended practice among some trading partners to grant
each other preferential treatment on service sectors such as transport or
telecommunications and on the recognition of professional qualifications.
For a sub-regional agreement aimed at the establishment of a common
market though, the MFN standard is a necessary component of a much
deeper system of integration. State Parties to the Treaty of Asunci6n
agreed not just to eliminate discrimination between each others' services
and service suppliers but to adopt a common trade policy in relation to
third States and to coordinate sectoral policies in the service sector
including transport and communication. 30 However, for the time being,
the common external trade policy and the coordination of sectoral
policies have not yet been fully implemented 3' and thus the MFN
standard still has a role to play. Unlike the GATS, the Protocol of
Montevideo does not allow Member States to introduce exceptions to
this standard. The MFN standard applies to any measure covered by the
Protocol, whatever the service sector that may be at stake.
2.

National Treatment

The National Treatment standard compels Member States to accord
services and service suppliers of any other Member State treatment no
less favorable than that it accords to its own like services and service
suppliers.3 The Protocol further specifies that Member States can meet
this standard by according either formally identical or formally different
treatment.3 3 Finally, the provision stipulates that formally identical or
formally different treatment must be considered "less favorable if it
modifies the conditions of competition in favor of services or service
29.

See Protocol of Montevideo, supra note 6, art. III.

30.

See Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 2, art. 1.

31. For example, in 2004 MERCOSUR authorised Uruguay to sign a Free Trade
Agreement with Mexico, including the liberalization of trade in services.
32. See Protocol of Montevideo, supra note 6, art. V.1.
33. See id., art. V.3.
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to like services or service
suppliers of the Member State compared
34
State.
Member
other
any
of
suppliers
The National Treatment standard cuts deeper into Member States'
policy autonomy, disciplining its fiscal, transportation and cultural
policies, to name just a few. However, its liberalization capacity is
diminished by the fact that its scope of application is constrained to those
service sectors included in each Member State's schedule of specific
commitments and under the circumstances specified there under. 35
3.

Market Access

The Market Access standard is designed to prevent Member States
from adopting overt quantitative restrictions such as measures limiting
the number or value of service transactions, the number of service
suppliers or the number of natural persons that may be employed in a
particular service sector.
Article IV lists six types of Market Access restrictions that are
expressly forbidden. Like the National Treatment standard, these are not
cross-sector prohibitions. Their scope of application is constrained to
those service sectors included in each Member State's schedule of
specific commitments and under the terms, limitations and conditions
specified there under.36
4.

Transparency

Member States must observe certain disciplines aimed at enhancing
the transparency of their regulatory activity.37 First, they have to publish
promptly national measures and international agreements that pertain to
or affect trade in services. Second, they must keep the MERCOSUR
Trade Commission ("MTC") updated on regulatory changes that may
affect significantly trade in services. Third, they must respond promptly
to requests by any other Member State on any of its measures that may
affect trade in services. Finally, each Member State may notify the MTC
of any measure taken by any other Member State, which it considers,
affects the operation of the Protocol.
By promoting the disclosure of information on national regulations,
transparency standards could make a significant contribution towards the
liberalization of trade in services. A more transparent rule-making
process provides Member States with the opportunity to scrutinize the

34.
35.
36.
37.

See id.,
See id.,
See id.,
See id.,

art. V.4.
art. VII.2.
art. VII.2.
art. VII.
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compatibility of new regulations with treaty provisions at an early stage.
It also forces domestic regulators to consider more carefully the possible
costs and benefits of their regulatory decisions and, ultimately, it
encourages better regulation and greater compliance. Transparency also
facilitates foreign service providers' access to updated information about
regulations currently in force. The real impact of transparency standards
on the liberalization of trade in services, like other obligations and
disciplines, will depend on the way they are implemented.
5. Reasonable, Objective and Impartial
Measures Affecting Trade in Services

Administration

of

Member States must administer measures of general application
affecting trade in services in a reasonable, objective and impartial
manner. This discipline is particularly relevant for the liberalization of
trade in services, which is frequently obstructed not only by
discriminatory rules but also by non-discriminatory rules applied in a
discriminatory way. For instance, discriminatory delays in required
government approvals, licenses and clearances; discriminatory access to
data collected by the government and discriminatory enforcement of
regulations against foreign service providers can result in a major
obstacle to trade in services.38 Contrary to GATS, the Protocol does not
limit the scope of application of these standards to sectors where specific
commitments have been undertaken.
6.
Procedural Standards for the Adoption of Administrative
Decisions Affecting Trade in Services
Many service industries operate under the close and constant
supervision of administrative agencies, which tend to have broad powers
of intervention on their business. For instance, financial supervisory
authorities must monitor the solvency of financial undertakings, and in
compliance with their duties they may conduct investigations, request the
adoption of contingency measures and, if necessary, they may suspend or
withdraw an authorization to operate. Similarly, utilities regulators may
impose on service providers requirements on prices or conditions of
access to the service provided. All these administrative decisions could
potentially discriminate against foreign services and service providers.
38. A survey on the most frequent barriers to trade in services among service
industry operators found that in many cases the discriminatory treatment is not written
into the published laws and regulations but it is a matter of official practice, i.e., "the way
things have always been done..." or the "general bureaucratic tendency not to approve
new activities." See GEZA FEKETEKUTY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES. AN
OVERVIEW AND BLUEPRINT FORNEGOTIATIONS 141 (1988).
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The Protocol includes some procedural standards aimed at
encouraging the adoption of administrative decisions based on objective
and impartial criteria, minimizing the risk of discriminatory decisions.
Article X.2 prescribes that Member States must grant all service
providers affected by administrative decisions the right to have access to
an impartial and objective procedural review of those decisions and,
where necessary, to the application of appropriate remedies. Article X.3
prescribes that applications relating to licenses, registrations, certificates
or other kind of authorization required for the supply of a service must be
dealt with by the competent authority "within a reasonable period of
time" and that the authorities must make a decision and if they consider
the application to be incomplete, they must inform the applicant of the
status of the application "without undue delay." The aim of the
procedural standards is not to constrain administrative agencies'
discretion to make decisions on the basis of merit, but to request the
administrator to follow minimum procedural steps when making such
decisions which ultimately should encourage more sound and evenhanded administrative practices.
7.
Necessary Technical Standards, Qualification and Licensing
Requirements
The Protocol includes an open list of more stringent disciplines
aimed at preventing measures and procedures relating to technical
standards, qualification requirements and licensing requirements from
constituting unnecessary barriers to trade in services. These disciplines
prescribe that such measures and procedures must be, inter alia:
i. based on objective and transparent criteria, such as competence and
ability to supply the service;
ii. not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the
service; and
iii. in the case of licensing procedures,
not in themselves a restriction
39
on the supply of the service.
Contrary to GATS,4 ° under the Protocol these disciplines apply to
39. Protocol of Montevideo, supra note 6, art. X.4.
40. GATS negotiators did not agree to apply these regulatory standards to all service
sectors. However, recognizing their role in preventing unnecessary barriers to trade in
services, they agreed to continue negotiating on the development of these standards once
GATS had entered into force. Article VI.4 of the GATS entrusts the Council for Trade in
Services, through the appropriate bodies it may establish, with the task to develop any
discipline that could be necessary based on these regulatory standards. So far, detailed
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all service sectors, regardless of Member States' specific commitments.
They provide the legal basis for undertaking a much deeper review of
national measures and procedures on technical standards, qualification
requirements and licensing requirements. The necessity test allows for
the review of the appropriateness of the means employed to secure the
quality of a service in light of their trade-restrictive costs, which opens
the door to go far beyond a discriminatory test and struck down measures
that, despite being indistinctly applicable in character, they nonetheless
create more trade restrictions than necessary to attain their regulatory
goals.
C.

Impact of the General Obligationsand Disciplines on the
Liberalizationof Trade in Services

Since the Protocol of Montevideo has just entered into force, it is
still too early to assess the impact that its general obligations and
disciplines have had on the liberalization of trade in services in
MERCOSUR. However, based on the analysis of the Protocol's
provisions and on the institutional framework responsible for their
implementation and enforcement, it is possible to anticipate some
limitations that will affect the capacity of the general obligations and
disciplines to liberalize trade in services and to put forward some
proposals to overcome them.
To begin with, the capacity of the general obligations and
disciplines to liberalize trade in services is limited by their narrow scope
of application. As previously mentioned, Member States are bound to
accord Market Access and National Treatment standards to foreign
service providers only in those sectors included in their schedule of
specific commitments and under the conditions thereby established. In
addition, the Protocol's main obligations-Market Access and National
Treatment-are well suited to tackle overt quantitative restrictions and
discriminatory measures and practices, but are less effective to deal with
more subtle trade restrictive measures such as the dual regulatory burden
problem caused by non-discriminatory regulations.4 1 Considering that
service markets are heavily regulated, this is a serious handicap, in
particular for a liberalization process aimed at the establishment of a
common market.
Eventually, ad-hoc arbitration tribunals could

disciplines have been developed for the accountancy sector. However, only those
countries that have made specific commitments in the accountancy sector are bound by
these disciplines.
41. The Protocol does include a non-discriminatory standard, the necessity test, but
limits its scope of application to technical standards, qualifications and licensing
requirements. See Protocol of Montevideo, supra note 6, art. X.4.
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overcome this limitation by interpreting the meaning of "de facto"
discrimination broadly.
Ultimately, the impact of the Protocol's general obligations and
disciplines on the liberalization of trade in services will largely depend
on the capacity of MERCOSUR institutions and mechanisms to apply
them and, in particular, on the way MERCOSUR adjudicatory bodies
interpret them.42
The Protocol entrusts the settlement of disputes that may arise
between Member States regarding to the application, interpretation or
non-fulfillment of the commitments established by the Protocol of
Montevideo to the MERCOSUR dispute settlement system, 43 which has
important limitations. Typical of a purely intergovernmental agreement,
MERCOSUR lacks a supranational court and its disputes are settled by
ad-hoc arbitration tribunals. Despite recent improvements, like the
possibility to appeal the arbitration award before the Permanent Tribunal
of Revision, 4 locus standi remains closed to Member States. Individuals
affected by trade-restrictive measures must first resort to the National
Section of the CMG for the initiation of consultation proceedings. If
consultations fail to settle the dispute, the controversy may continue on
to the arbitration stage only if a Member State adopts the individual's
complaint as its own. Thus, there is always the risk that private parties'
interests may end up diluted in broader geopolitical concerns.45
Notwithstanding its limitations, the capacity of the dispute
settlement system to enforce Member States' legal commitments,
including the Protocol's general obligations and disciplines, should not
be underestimated. A recent arbitration award has confirmed the binding
effect of the Protocol upon Member States.46 The award holds that the
42. Adjudicatory bodies responsible for interpreting treaty-based general obligations
and disciplines play a critical role. A too restrictive interpretation of their scope of
application or their normative implications may limit their capacity to strike down traderestrictive measures. By contrast, a too liberal interpretation may unduly constrain
Member States' domestic regulatory autonomy, undermining the political legitimacy of
the integration process.
43. See Protocol of Montevideo, supra note 6, art. XXV.
44. See The Protocol of Olivos for the Settlement of Disputes, Feb. 18, 2002, 42
I.L.M. 2 (replacing the Protocol of Brasilia for the Settlement of Disputes, Dec. 17,
1991).
45. See Thomas Andrew O'Keefe, Dispute Resolution in MERCOSUR, 3 J. WORLD
INVESTMENT 507 (2002), available at http://www.mercosurconsulting.net/Articles/
article 10.html.
46. See Laudo del Tribunal Arbitral "Ad Hoc" de MERCOSUR Constituido para
Entender de la Controversia Presentada por la Repdblica Oriental del Uruguay a La
Repfiblica Argentina Sobre "Omisi6n Del Estado Argentino en Adoptar Medidas
Apropiadas para Prevenir Y/O Hacer Cesar Los Impedimentos a laLibre Circulaci6n
Derivados de los Cortes en Territorio Argentino de Vias de Acceso a los Puentes
Intemacionales Gral. San Martin Y Gral. Artigas Que Unen La Repfiblica Argentina con
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free movement of services, particularly Transport and Tourism Services,
were affected by the persistent and continuous blocking of motorways
that link Uruguay and Argentina caused by environmental activists on
the Argentine bank of the River Uruguay.4 7 Furthermore, the award
prescribes that the failure of Argentine authorities to adopt the necessary
measures to prevent or at least to put an end to those blockings of
motorways is not compatible with MERCOSUR Members' commitment
to secure the free movement of goods and services across their
territories. 48
The award rejects the Argentine argument that the Protocol of
Montevideo only compels Member States not to adopt governmental
measures that affect the free movement of services. Instead, it holds that
the authorities of a Member State are under the obligation to prevent or
to put an end to the obstructions to the free movement of goods and
services caused by private parties, even in the absence of an express rule
that prescribes such conduct. The Tribunal argues that such obligation
stems from the commitment on free movement undertaken by Member
States, which also involves the obligation to adopt the necessary means
to secure such commitment.4 9
Previous awards relating to measures affecting the free movement
of goods have also held that Article 1 of the Treaty of Asunci6n
prescribes a clear, defined and self-executing obligation and that custom
duties, charges of equivalent effect and other restrictions on regional
products are absolutely prohibited. 50 So far, the evidence stemming from
the arbitration awards suggests that when a dispute reaches the
arbitration stage, the competent tribunal will look at the claim seriously
and will examine the compatibility of the challenged measure in light of
a broad understanding of Member States' free trade commitments,
whether expressed or implied by the applicable legislation. Therefore, in

La Reptblica Oriental del Uruguay" [Arbitration Award on the Dispute Between
Uruguay and Argentina Relating to the Omission of the Argentine Republic to Prevent
the Impediment to the Free Movement of Goods and Services by Obstructing Access to
International Bridges]
105, Sept. 6, 2006, available at http://www.mercosur.int/
msweb/portal%20intermediario/es/controversias/arquivos/TPRTribunal%2OAdHocLau
do%20Libre%2OCirculacionES.pdf.
47.

Id.at

111-114.

48. Id.(Tribunal's decision, second consideration).
49. Id. 117, 118.
50. See Laudo del Tribunal Arbitral "Ad Hoc" de MERCOSUR Constituido para
Decidir en la Controversia Entre La Repfiblica del Paraguay a La Repiiblica Oriental del
Uruguay Sobre La Aplicaci6n del "IMIESI" (Impuesto Especifico Interno) a ]a
Comercializaci6n de Cigarrillos [Arbitration Award on the Dispute Between Paraguay
and Uruguay Relating to an Excise Duty on Cigarettes Imposed by Uruguay] 14, May 21,
2002,
available
at
http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/es/
controversias/arquivosNIII%20LAUDO.pdf.
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theory, the dispute settlement system could be an effective mechanism
for the enforcement of the Protocol's general obligations and disciplines.
In practice, however, only a tiny proportion of Member States' measures
and practices incompatible with MERCOSUR law end up being
challenged before a MERCOSUR ad-hoc Tribunal.5 1
The Protocol places on the MTC the overall responsibility for the
application of the Protocol and assigns to this body the following
functions: to receive information about measures adopted by Member
States which allegedly affect the operation of the Protocol, to receive
information about measures adopted by Member States for the protection
of essential security interests, and to deal with consultations and claims
submitted by Member States relating to the application, interpretation or
non-fulfillment of the Protocol of Montevideo.52
Until now, no procedure has been established for Member States to
inform the MTC about the modification or introduction of new
regulations affecting trade in services or measures adopted for the
protection of essential security interests and it is unlikely that this
procedure will be set up in the near future. The MTC meets on average
once a month, has limited resources and is already overloaded by its role
assisting the CMG in the supervision of the application of the common
trade policy. Nevertheless, it would be advisable for the MTC to take the
first steps to comply with the Protocol's mandate by, for instance,
creating a technical committee on trade in services.
In summary, the general obligations and disciplines included in the
Protocol of Montevideo constitute a key legal instrument for the
liberalization of trade in services since trade liberalization is a process of
permanent character, which requires the constant monitoring of domestic
regulatory practices to prevent the adoption of new barriers and to
encourage best regulatory practices based on objective, transparent and
impartial criteria. However, the capacity of the Protocol's general
obligations and disciplines to contribute with the liberalization of trade in
services in MERCOSUR will be constrained by their narrow scope of
application and by the limitations of the dispute settlement system
responsible for their enforcement.

51. Between 1995 and 2006 only twelve arbitration awards have been issued by ad
hoc Tribunals and one of them (remodelled tyres) was subject to review by the Permanent
Review Tribunal.
52. See Protocol of Montevideo, supra note 6, art. XXIII.
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III. Negotiation of Specific Commitments
A.

The Protocol's Programof Liberalization of Trade in Services

Following the provisions of Part IV of the GATS, Part III of the
Protocol establishes a Program of Liberalization on Trade in Services.
The Program of Liberalization is a mechanism for advancing the
liberalization of trade in services through the negotiation of specific
commitments on Market Access and National Treatment. It provides for
a gradual or "positive list" approach to the liberalization of trade in
services, by which Member States set out in national schedules of
commitments the sectors, sub-sectors, modes of supply and conditions
under which they wish to assume specific commitments on Market
Access and National Treatment.5 3 At the same time, the Program
compels Member States to enter into successive rounds of negotiations
aimed at the progressive inclusion of sectors, sub-sectors, activities and
modes of supply of services in Member States' schedules, as well as the
reduction or elimination of trade-restrictive measures, with a view to
ensure effective Market Access.54

Upon the conclusion of each negotiation round, new concessions are
recorded in each Member State's schedule of specific commitments,
which by virtue of Article VII.4 must be annexed to the Protocol and
shall form an integral part thereof. The Protocol stipulates that
negotiation rounds must be conducted on a yearly basis and that the
Program of Liberalization must be completed on a period no longer than
ten years since the Protocol's entry into force. 55 The positive list
approach enables each Member State to control, within the ten years time
frame, the scope of its liberalization commitments and the pace of the
liberalization process, according to the particular strengths and
weaknesses of its various service sectors.
One of the main reasons that has been invoked in favor of importing
a GATS's style Program of Liberalization for the opening of services
markets is its gradualism. Pefia, for instance, claims that the gradualism
prescribed by the Program of Liberalization is in line with the principles
of gradualism, flexibility and balance that have guided MERCOSUR
integration process from its very beginning.56 She argues that the
Program of Liberalization allows for the gradual adaptation of Member
States that are starting out with dissimilar conditions concerning their

53.
54.

Id. art. VII.2.

55.

Id. art. XIX.1.

56.

See Maria-Ang61ica Pefia, supra note 7, at 155.

Id. art. XIX.1.
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internal regulations for the various services sectors.5 7 Pefia also asserts
that the positive list approach combined with the obligation to conduct
annual rounds of negotiations towards the complete liberalization of
trade in services within a ten years period enables even the smallest and
most vulnerable countries to establish temporary restrictions on Market
Access in order to prepare their most sensitive or most de-regulated
sectors for a broader market.58
Political economy reasons suggest that the opening of services
markets should be gradual,59 in particular for fledgling integration
process conditioned by unstable macroeconomic circumstances and
sharp structural and policy asymmetries among participant States. What
remains questionable is whether a GATS-style Program of Liberalization
based on rounds of negotiations over positive lists of specific
commitments constitutes the best alternative for securing the gradualism
that MERCOSUR needs for its process of liberalization of trade in
services.
First, comparable integration experiences have resorted to other
strategies in order to secure the gradualism of the liberalization process.
For instance, during the early stages of integration of the-at that timeEuropean Economic Community, various programs were designed and
implemented for the progressive abolition of restrictions to the
movement of services. 60 These programs were elaborated on the basis of
a common understanding that the ultimate objective was the
establishment of a common market. They consisted on the adoption or
removal of a detailed list of measures subject to a binding timetable.
Gradualism was secured by fixing the deadlines for the adoption of the
61
liberalizing measures in accordance with their implementation costs.
Another alternative is the "negative list approach" followed by NAFTA

57.
58.

Id. at 155.
Id. at 163.

59. See, e.g., B. HOEKMAN AND MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, (2001).
The authors contend that because of the

sensitivity of the public policy issues at stake, the liberalization of trade in services tends
to be more resisted than the liberalization of trade in goods and thus, require a gradual
and carefully negotiated liberalization process, more palatable to domestic constituencies.
60. See, e.g., General Programme for the Abolition of Restrictions of Freedom to
Provide Services, 1962 O.J. 32, (Jan. 15, 1962); see also Completing the Internal Market:
White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, June 28-29, 1985, COM
(1982) 310 final (June 14, 1985).
61. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 15, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992
O.J. (C 224) 1 [1992], 1 C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty]. "When drawing up its
proposals with a view to achieving the objectives set out in Article 14, the Commission
shall take into account the extent of the effort that certain economies showing differences
in development will have to sustain during the period of establishment of the internal
market and it may propose appropriate provisions .. " Id.
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and NAFTA-type agreements, whereby parties to the agreement commit
themselves from the outset to grant Market Access and to accord
National Treatment to all foreign services and services suppliers in all
sectors unless otherwise specified in a closed list of exemptions or nonconforming measures, set out in an annex. In this case, what Member
States may have to negotiate is the phase out of the exceptions rather
than the phase in of positive commitments on Market Access and
National Treatment.6 2
Second, apart from the difficulties faced by negotiators in
measuring the value of concessions for reciprocal bargaining purposes,
the logic underlying the negotiation of specific commitments tends to
prioritize short-term interests and individualistic negotiation strategies
over long-term interests and co-operative actions towards the formation
of a common market. For instance, it happened on a number of
occasions during the negotiation rounds, that some Member States
offered to eliminate or reduce restrictions in certain sectors or modes of
supply but, ultimately, the offers were withdrawn on the grounds that
they were not matched by comparable offers from other Member States.
Like the GATS, the Program of Liberalization is subject to two
important limitations. First, the need for the liberalization process to
respect the right of each Member State to regulate, and to introduce new
regulations within their territories with a view to meet national policy
objectives relative to the service sector. 63 The right to regulate is defined
broadly, covering, inter alia regulations affecting Market Access or
National Treatment, although its exercise is subject to the condition not
to annul or impair the obligations arising from the Protocol and from a
Member State's schedule of specific commitments. 64
It is understandable to find a qualification of this kind in the context
of a multilateral agreement among over one hundred and forty countries
characterized by sharp differences in their level of development. It
seems less compelling to include such qualification in the context of a
sub-regional agreement between few countries with relatively similar
levels of development. In particular, it is difficult to reconcile the
express recognition of Member States' right to regulate and to pursue
their own national policies with MERCOSUR's purpose to establish a

62. For further analysis on the advantages and disadvantages of the "positive list"
and the "negative list" approach, see Sherry Stephenson & Francisco Prieto, Evaluating
Approaches to the Liberalizationof Trade in Services: Insightsfrom Regional Experience
in the Americas in TRADE POLICY FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: A

HANDBOOK l(World Bank 2001).
63. Protocol of Montevideo, supra note 6, art. XIX.4. The GATS refers to the right
to regulate in its preamble, not in a specific provision of the agreement.
64. Id. art. XIX.4.
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common market involving the free movement of services and the
coordination of macroeconomic and sectoral policies, including services
sectoral policies like transport and communications.
The second limitation refers to the Member States' right to modify
or suspend their specific commitments during the implementation of the
Program of Liberalization. Article XX of the Protocol enables a Member
State to take back something it has given in past negotiations, but only at
a price and after due notice. The right to suspend or modify specific
commitments can only be exercised in exceptional circumstances and its
effects are subject to the principle of non-retroactivity in order to protect
acquired rights.6 5 In addition, the Member State wishing to suspend or
modify its commitments must notify the CMG and duly justify its
decision. It must also hold consultations with the Member States which
are considered to be affected, with a view to reach an agreement on the
specific measures to be applied and their period of application.6 6 In
practice, all Member States have67already exercised their right to modify
their schedules of commitments.
The Protocol entrusts the task of calling and supervising the rounds
of negotiations of specific commitments to the CMG.68 The CMG has
delegated this task to the Group of Services, one of its auxiliary bodies.69
The CMG is also responsible for receiving notifications and the results of
the consultations on the modification and/or suspension of specific
commitments. 70 The CMC is the body responsible for approving the
results of the negotiation
rounds as well as any modification or
71
suspension thereof.
B.

Impact of the Negotiation Rounds on the Liberalizationof Trade in
Services
Negotiation rounds on specific commitments started in 1998, soon

65.

Id. art. XX. 1.

66.

Id. art. XX.2.

67. In 2000, Brazil notified the CMG of two new restrictions affecting its previous
commitments relating to mobile services, private leased circuit services and paging. See
Brazil's notification to the CMG on Annex VII to the minutes of the XXXXVII CMG
Meeting, Buenos Aires, Apr. 4-5, 2000 [on file with author]. In 2004, Argentina
(Maintenance and Repair of Vessels), Paraguay (Horizontal restrictions on Mode 3) and
Uruguay (Pharmacy Services, Retailing Services) notified the CMG of new restrictions to
their specific commitments approved by the IV round of negotiations. See Argentina's,
Paraguay's and Uruguay's notification to the CMG on Annex XXXVII to the minutes of
the LVI CMG Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, Nov. 25-26, 2004 [on file with author].
68. Protocol of Montevideo, supra note 6, art. XXII (a).
69. See MERCOSUR Resolution GMC 31/98, (July 23, 1998).
70. Protocol of Montevideo, supra note 6, art. XXII(b).
71. Id. art. XXI.
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after the Protocol of Montevideo was approved, but long before the
Protocol entered into force. Between 1998 and 2006, six negotiation
rounds have been completed on a de facto basis. It is an accumulative
process, where the results of the last round include the results of the
previous one. The schedules of specific commitments resulting from the
sixth negotiation round have been approved by the CMC in July 2006,72
however, since they have not been incorporated into Member States'73
national legal systems, they are not legally binding upon them.
Member States have nevertheless pledged to make their best efforts to
observe their specific commitments.74
To be compatible with the WTO, Member States' schedules of
specific commitments must provide for a "substantial coverage" of
sectors and modes of supply and must aim at the elimination of
"substantially all discrimination., 75 In this vein, the Modalities for the
Negotiation of Initial Specific Commitments, provide that negotiations
must aim at deepening Member States' specific commitments under the
have a substantial coverage of service sectors
WTO, and that they must
76
and modes of supply.
The negotiation modalities and procedures used by Member States
closely follow those used at the multilateral level. For example,
negotiations are conducted by way of exchanging request and offer lists,
service sectors are classified according to the WTO Secretariat's
Services Sectoral Classification List, 77 and specific commitments are
inscribed in Member States' schedules in accordance with WTO
Guidelines for the Scheduling of Specific Commitments.78
Every schedule specifies the sectors and sub-sectors where

72. See MERCOSUR CMC Decision 1/06, (July 20, 2006).
73. Article XXVII.3 of the Protocol prescribes that for their entry into force, the
schedules of specific commitments resulting from the negotiation rounds must be
incorporated into national legal systems in accordance with the procedures provided for
in each Member State. So far, only Argentina and Uruguay have completed the
incorporation process for their initial schedules of specific commitments and Brazil for
the schedule of commitments approved by the first negotiation round.
74. See Minutes of the II meeting of the Group of Services, Asunci6n, Mar. 16-18,
1999 [on file with author].
75. See GATS, supra note 5, art. V, I 1(a), 1(b).
76. MERCOSUR CMG Resolution 67/97 art. 4 (Dec. 13, 1997)
77. See GATS Secretariat, Services Sectoral ClassificationsList, MTN.GNS/W/120
(Jul. 10, 1991) [hereinafter Sectoral Classifications List]. For the classification of subsectors, Member States may rely on the United Nations Provisional Central Product
Registry,
Division-Classification
Nations
Statistics
Classification.United
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?CI=9&Lg=l (last visited May 7, 2007).
78. See Council for Trade in Services, Guidelines for the Scheduling of Specific
Commitments Under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GA TS) S/L/92 (Mar.
28, 2001).
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commitments are undertaken. 79 For each service sector or sub-sector
there are eight entries: one entry for each mode of supply (cross-border
supply, consumption abroad, commercial presence and presence of
natural persons) under a Market Access column and one entry for each
mode of supply under a National Treatment column. Schedules also
include a third column reserved for "Additional Commitments" not
subject to scheduling under the Market Access or National Treatment
columns, for instance, commitments relating to qualifications, standards
or licensing matters. 8°
The level of commitment in a specific sector for each mode of
supply can range from a full commitment to a commitment with
limitations or no commitment at all. 8 1 A full commitment on Market
Access means the Member State does not maintain for that mode of
supply any of the types of measures listed in Article IV. A full
commitment on National Treatment means the Member State accords to
foreign services and service suppliers conditions of competition no less
favorable than those accorded to its own like services and service
suppliers.8 2 Full commitments are recorded in the schedule with a
"NONE" entry.
A Member State can also make commitments with limitations,
inscribing in the schedule a concise description of the measure
inconsistent with Articles IV or V it wishes to maintain. Finally, a
Member State may opt not to make any commitment whatsoever for a
specific mode of supply, i.e., to remain free to adopt measures
inconsistent with Articles IV or V. The absence of commitments is
recorded in the schedule with an "UNBOUND" entry. Eight "NONE"
entries for a specific service sector means that trade in services is
completely liberalized for all modes of supply, namely, that the Member
State is legally bound not to adopt any measure inconsistent with Articles
IV or V. The fewer the number of "NONE" entries, the lower the level
of liberalization for that service sector.
The following paragraphs examine Member States' most recent
schedules of specific commitments, using Hoekman's method to assess
the potential impact they could have on the liberalization of trade in
services once they enter into force. 83 The quantitative data gives a rough
79. Member States' schedules follow the WTO Secretariat's Services Sectoral
Classification List. Sectoral ClassificationsList, supra note 78.
80. Protocol of Montevideo, supra note 6, art. VI.
81. Id.art.VII.I.
82. Id. art. V.
83. Bernard Hoekman has pioneered a method for the estimation of the degree of
liberalization of trade in services based on a quantitative analysis of Member States'
schedules of specific commitments. It gives a value of "1" for an entry of "NONE" on
both the Market Access and the National Treatment columns. Then, it calculates the ratio
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idea of the degree of liberalization of the various service sectors and
allows for making comparisons between Member States' specific
commitments.84 It has to be borne in mind, however, that Hoekman's
method does not take into account horizontal limitations for specific
modes of supply which are applicable to all service sectors.8 5
1.

Professional Services

Argentina's, Brazil's and Uruguay's schedules of specific
commitments reveal a moderately high level of liberalization of
Professional Services, while Paraguay has not undertaken any binding
commitment in this sector. Specific commitments vary according to the
profession, with Architectural and Engineering Services being the most
liberalized and Medical-related Services the least liberalized.
The quantitative data must be qualified by Member States'
horizontal limitations on Mode 4, which is probably the most important
mode of supply for Professional Services, and other horizontal
limitations relating to qualification requirements, residency requirements
and membership of professional bodies' requirements. For instance,
both Argentina and Uruguay specify in their schedules that any person
seeking to provide professional services in their country must first obtain
recognition of their professional degree, enroll in the relevant
professional body, and establish a registered office in the country.
Therefore, in practical terms, there is still a long way to go for the
liberalization of trade in Professional Services. The negotiation of
specific commitments could, at best, provide for a limited degree of
liberalization, but in order to ensure effective market access it is clear
that the development of secondary legislation is essential. In this vein, it
of "NONE" entries on both the Market Access and National Treatment columns over the
total number of possible entries for each service sector or sub-sector. See Bernard
Hoekman, Assessing the General Agreement on Trade in Services in THE URUGUAY
ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 327 (Will Martin and L. Alan Winters eds.,
1995).
84. See Annex, Table 1 Degree of Liberalization of Service Sectors by Member
State-July 2006.
85. For instance, each Member States' schedule of commitments include a
horizontal limitation on Mode 4 (presence of natural persons supplying services), which
limits all sector-specific commitments on this mode of supply to a restricted number of
categories of natural persons (Intra-corporate Transferees, Business Visitors,
Professionals and specialized Technicians, Representatives of Foreign Companies).
Brazil's and Paraguay's schedules also include horizontal limitations on Mode 3
(commercial presence of foreign service suppliers), which specify that foreign service
suppliers wishing to supply a service as a legal person in their territory must be organized
as a legal entity foreseen by their domestic laws. In addition, the Brazilian schedule
states that to be eligible for remittances, foreign service suppliers established in Brazilian
territory must be registered with the Central Bank of Brazil.
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is worth highlighting the participation of some professional bodies on
the negotiation of the mutual recognition of professional qualifications
the provision of professional services on a
with a view to facilitate
6
basis.
temporary
2.

Communication Services

The postal services market is virtually closed to foreign competition
in the four countries. Audiovisual Services are very restricted as well,
with every country maintaining restrictions on Market Access (e.g.,
quotas on foreign films, preferences for state owned companies on the
assignation of TV and radio frequencies) and National Treatment (e.g.,
national-ownership requirements for TV and radio companies,
nationality requirements for film producers).
The level of liberalization of Telecommunication Services is
characterized by important asymmetries among Member States, with a
relatively high level of liberalization in Argentina, along with a
significantly lower level of liberalization in the other three Member
States.
Brazil's specific commitments provide for a high level of
liberalization, with all modes of supply but Mode 4 completely
liberalized for all telecom sub-sectors, however, its schedule also
includes important horizontal limitations. First, the Executive Power is
allowed by legislation to limit the foreign ownership of the capital of any
telecom undertaking. In addition, all telecom providers need a license to
operate from ANATEL 87 and licenses are issued only to legal persons set
up according to Brazilian legislation, with registered address in Brazil
and with the majority of capital or voting rights controlled by Brazilian
nationals.
Similarly, the Paraguayan schedule includes a horizontal note
stipulating that each telecommunication service provider in Paraguay
requires a government licence granted by CONATEL 88 according to a
transparent and non-discriminatory procedure. The licenses are granted
exclusively to legal persons (corporations or Limited Liability
Companies) constituted in accordance with the national law of Paraguay,
with headquarters and representation in the Paraguayan territory and with
at least 50 percent of their capital owned by Paraguayan nationals.
In Uruguay, the level of liberalization of Value-added Services
86. See MERCOSUR CMC Decision 25/03, (Dec. 16, 2003); see infra note 130.
87. Ag~ncia Nacional de Telecomunicac6es (National Telecommunications
Agency).
88. Comisi6n Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (Nactional Telecommunications
Comission), established by Ley No. 642 de Telecomunicaciones, May 25, 1995.
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(electronic mail, electronic data interchange, etc.) is moderately high, but
Basic Telecommunication Services are provided under monopoly
conditions by a state-owned enterprise (ANTEL8 9).
3.

Environmental Services

Along with Postal Services, Environmental Services including
Sewage, Refuse Disposal, and Sanitation Services, are among the least
liberalized.
These services are usually provided by state-owned
enterprises under monopoly conditions or through local government
authorities. In some cases, private contractors are allowed to enter the
market under concession regimes but, overall, competition in this sector
tends to be highly restricted.
4.

Financial Services

Financial markets are highly regulated in every jurisdiction.
Financial undertakings cannot operate without a license and their
activities are subject to a number of prudential regulations and conduct
of business regulations. It is for these types of sectors where the
limitations of the negotiation of specific commitments as a mechanism
for the liberalization of trade in services become apparent. At best,
successful negotiations may contribute to remove quantitative
restrictions to the commercial presence of foreign service providers or
overt discriminatory measures in terms of licensing or supervision, but it
is a mechanism totally ineffective to address the dual regulatory burden
problem caused by the duplication of supervisory regimes. All Member
States' schedules include horizontal limitations to their Financial
Services' commitments aimed at preserving their supervisory prerogative
over any financial undertaking that operates in their territories. It is with
these limitations in mind, that Member States' commitments in this
sector should be assessed.
In Argentina, Financial Services other than Insurance enjoy the
highest level of liberalization. Although Insurance Services tend to be
more restricted, there are no limitations for the commercial presence of
foreign insurance service providers, something that finds no parallel in
any other Member State. 90 Regarding Banking and other Financial
Services, Argentina's schedule does not include limitations either to the
commercial presence of foreign service suppliers or to the consumption

89. Administraci6n Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (National Telecommunications
Administration).
90. It must be specified, however, that commitments related to services auxiliary to
insurance (including broking and agency services) remain "unbound."
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of Financial Services abroad. Argentina's liberal approach on Banking
Services has been recently constrained by the adoption of stricter
controls over the outflow of capital. 9 '
In Uruguay, the level of liberalization of Financial Services is
moderately high, although there are some horizontal limitations such as
quantitative restrictions on bank licenses.92 The main Banking Services,
such as the accepting of deposits and lending of all types, are almost
completely liberalized, while for Investment Services some restrictions
remain in place. Insurance Services can only be provided either by the
State Insurance Bank, a state-owned company, or by public limited
companies with nominative shares. In addition, insurance against
accidents at work and professional sickness are provided only by the
State Insurance Bank. Apart from these limitations, insurance markets
are moderately open to the commercial presence of foreign service
providers.
In Brazil and Paraguay, the level of liberalization of financial
services is very low, with hardly any commitments made so far. In
addition, both countries include horizontal limitations to the commercial
mode of supply of financial services. In Brazil, for instance, in addition
to the need to obtain a license to operate and being subject to the
supervision of Brazilian financial supervisory authorities, all financial
companies must be incorporated under Brazilian law in the form of a
"sociedade an6nima." Moreover, financial service providers other than
insurance service suppliers may be required to fulfill specific conditions,
and all members of senior level management must be permanent
residents in Brazil.
Overall, after six rounds of negotiations, Member States have made
a slow but steady progress in consolidating the status quo of their
domestic legislation. The fact that, in general terms, schedules of
specific commitments reflect the current status of Member States'
domestic legislation constitutes an important step towards the
liberalization of trade in services because of its "lock in effect" (i.e., it
prevents Member States from introducing new limitations to trade in
services in the future). The consolidation of the status quo also
contributes to the transparency of the process by preventing gaps
between bound commitments and applied commitments.9 3
91. This policy shift was adopted during the aftermath of the severe financial crisis
that hit Argentina in December 2001.
92. Every year, the number of licenses for the operation of new banks cannot be
more than 10 percent higher than the authorisations granted during the previous year.
93. In the GATS context there is an extended negotiation practice to make
commitments more restrictive than the current legislation. This practice enables Member
States to preserve some manoeuvring room for future negotiations, making "new" offers
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At the same time, the negotiation of specific commitments have
yielded very little results beyond the consolidation of the status quo. The
horizontal limitations included in any of the schedules, and the
asymmetries in the level of liberalization according to the service sectors
and modes of supply gives an idea of the scale of the job that may lay
ahead. Even though Member States have exchanged request and offer
lists for the elimination of existing restrictions on Market Access and
National Treatment, they have not managed to agree on a preferential
treatment for MERCOSUR services and service providers.
Most
requests for concessions have been denied, among other reasons, on
grounds of lack of reciprocal concessions from the requesting State, the
need for further consultations at domestic level, or the need to wait until
the culmination of a regulatory reform process.
So far, the implementation of the Program of Liberalization has
confirmed the limitations of the negotiation of specific commitments as a
mechanism for the liberalization of trade in services and the need to
complement it with alternative mechanisms such as the development of
secondary legislation to ensure the necessary conditions for the free
movement of services as prescribed by the Treaty of Asunci6n.
IV. Secondary Legislation on Trade in Services
A.

MERCOSUR Legislative Process

Trade liberalization is not only about removing trade-restrictive
domestic regulations or preventing new ones to emerge, but also about
providing new rules necessary for the proper functioning of the
integrated market. To this end, trade agreements seeking to reach
advanced levels of integration usually lay down an institutional
framework, which includes decision-making bodies endowed with rulemaking power. The rules made by these bodies are known as "secondary
legislation" or "derived law" by opposition to treaty provisions, which
are referred to as "primary legislation" or "original law." Secondary
legislation can make a vital contribution to the liberalization process, in
particular, by harmonizing disparate domestic regulations and thus
minimizing the trade-discouraging effect caused by the dual regulatory
problem.
At the same time, the creation, implementation and
enforcement of secondary legislation raises difficult legal issues, most
notably, the identification of the legal basis for the adoption of secondary
legislation, the legal effect of secondary legislation on individuals and
the relationship between secondary legislation and domestic laws.
without having to adopt fresh deregulatory measures.
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The MERCOSUR legal system has an international law status,
albeit with some particularities, and its institutional framework is based
on an intergovernmental model, which confers its Members' strict
control over the scope and pace of the integration process. MERCOSUR
decision-making bodies (CMC, CMG and MTC) are formed by
government officials from the executive power of each Member State
and all decisions must be taken by consensus with the presence of all
Member States. 94 So far, MERCOSUR decision-making bodies have
produced a voluminous body of secondary rules including CMC
Decisions, CMG Resolutions and MTC Directives. 95 MERCOSUR
secondary legislation is not directly applicable on Member States'
domestic legal systems. Member States must take the measures
necessary for its incorporation into their domestic legal system and
courts until they have
individuals cannot rely on them before national
96
been duly incorporated by all Member States.
The following paragraphs examine the process for the adoption of
MERCOSUR norms. Although the term "legislative process" could be
regarded as rather presumptuous for describing its current status of
development, in fact, MERCOSUR law already includes a number of
treaty provisions, CMC Decisions and CMG Resolutions containing
rules on how to make rules, which, taken together, stipulate the
realization of a series of diverse and autonomous acts, by different
actors, aimed at the production of rules. 9 '
The main features of MERCOSUR legislative process are its
decision-making system based on consensus, the lack of rules that clearly
stipulate the legal basis for the adoption of secondary legislation and the
need for all Member States to adopt the necessary measures to
incorporate the rules into their domestic legal systems for their entry into
force.
First, Decisions, Resolutions and Directives must be adopted by
consensus and in the presence of all Member States. 98 Notwithstanding
its advantages for Member States wary of giving away too much
sovereignty, from a technical perspective, the consensus rule introduces a
94. See Protocol of Ouro Preto, Dec. 17, 1994, Arg.-Braz.-Para.-Uru., arts. 4, 11, 16,
38, 34 I.L.M. 1244 [hereinafter POP].
95. By 2004 MERCOSUR secondary legislation included 331 CMC Decisions,
1,023 CMG Resolutions and 140 MTC Directives. See ALEJANDRO PEROTTI & DEISY
VENTURA, EL PROCEso LEGISLATIVO DEL MERCOSUR 23 (2004). The authors state that
approximately 150 norms were derogated. In addition, many of these norms have not
entered into force or consist of ordinary administrative decisions or political declarations
with no legal effect.
96. See POP, supra note 95, art. 40.
97.

See supra ALEJANDRO PEROTTI & DEISY VENTURA, note 96 at 17.

98.

See POP, supra note 95, art. 37.
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heavy degree of rigidity into the rule-making process.
Building
consensus is a lengthy and cost-intensive process, always at risk of being
derailed by short-term national interests, which prevents decision-making
bodies from delivering on time regulatory responses to the challenges
raised by an ever changing environment. While introducing a qualified
majority decision-making system is simply politically unfeasible and, at
least at this stage of the integration process, technically unnecessary, it
does not seem unreasonable to start thinking for alternatives to the
present all-encompassing consensus rule that governs the adoption of any
kind of measure, from far reaching policy measures to highly technical
and specific decisions, or ordinary administrative acts.
MERCOSUR decision-making bodies consist of government
officials, more precisely, representatives from the executive power and
within the executive branch the largest group corresponds to diplomats
from Member States' Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Decision-making
bodies are supported by a number of technical bodies in fulfilling their
functions. The CMG has the largest number of technical bodies
operating under its umbrella, including thirteen sub-working groups and
various other groups and specialized meetings. Technical bodies also
consist of equal number of government officials per Member State,
although in this case middle rank officials from other branches of the
executive, regulatory entities and other state agencies are also
represented. Technical bodies do not have decision-making power, but
they can, and normally do, submit proposals for the adoption of norms to
the decision-making body they support.
It must be noted that MERCOSUR institutional structure is
complemented by a Joint Parliamentary Commission 99-- now in the
process of being replaced by a fully fledged Parliament' 00 -- consisting of
Members of Parliament from the Member States and an Economic and
Social Consultative Forum (a consultative body consisting of
representatives from Member States' social and economic sectors, which
can issue non-binding Recommendations to the CMG).' 0 1 However, so
far, none02of these bodies have played an active role in the rule-making
process. 1
It is arguable whether this strictly governmental composition of
decision-making bodies, led by diplomats with a minimal input from
99. Id. at art. 22-27.
100. See Protocol on the Creation of MERCOSUR Parliament, approved by
MERCOSUR CMC Decision 23/05, (Dec. 8, 2005).
101. See POP, supra note 95, arts. 28-30.
102. See Cecilia Pena and Ricardo Rozenberg, MERCOSUR: A Different Approach to
Institutional Development, FOCAL POLICY PAPER FPP-05-06 5 (2005), www.focal.ca/
pdf/mercosur.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2007).
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Members of Parliament and representatives from the social and
economic sectors strikes the right balance between political legitimacy
and technical legitimacy that any rule-making process should aim at if its
rules are to be applied at all.
Second, the MERCOSUR legislative process lacks treaty provisions
that clearly stipulate the legal basis for the adoption of secondary
legislation. 0 3 Article 1 of the Treaty of Asunci6n prescribes, rather
vaguely, that the common market shall involve, among other things,
"The commitment by State Parties to harmonize their legislation in
pertinent areasto strengthen the integration process."10 4 The Protocol of
Ouro Preto enumerates MERCOSUR decision-making bodies' functions
and powers, but it fails to clearly specify in what areas and to what extent
the decision-making bodies can or cannot regulate. Not surprisingly,
secondary legislation has been developed in a rather chaotic and
unfocused way, following no priority criteria and covering a wide range
of topics, some of them not even remotely related to the liberalization of
trade.
Moreover, there is not a specific procedure in place for controlling
the validity of the Decisions, Resolutions or Directives adopted by the
decision-making bodies.10 5 This has resulted on problems of internal
incompatibility between MERCOSUR norms of the same level or
different levels and problems of external incompatibility between
MERCOSUR norms and domestic norms or between MERCOSUR
norms and other international public norms.10 6 In addition, the lack of
control over the legislative process has resulted on the adoption of acts

103. Compare EC Treaty, supra note 62, art. 5, and Protocol on the Application on
the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997 O.J. (C
340) 1.
104. Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 2, art. 1 (emphasis added).
105. There are, of course, general procedures established by the Protocol of Olivos for
the settlement of disputes arising between Member States in relation to the interpretation,
application or non-fulfilment of provisions of the Treaty of Asunci6n, the agreements
concluded within its framework, as well as CMC Decisions, CMG Resolutions and MTC
Directives. However, as they currently stand, these procedures are not suitable for
controlling the exercise of MERCOSUR bodies' rule-making power because the locus
standi before MERCOSUR ad hoc Tribunals is limited to Member States and it is
unlikely that any Member State would resort to this procedure to challenge the validity of
norms adopted by consensus.
106. In order to minimise the internal incompatibility problem, the CMC adopted
Decision 30/02, entrusting the MERCOSUR Secretariat, amongst other things with the
function of controlling the legal consistency of draft norms with existing norms.
MERCOSUR CMC.Decision, 30/02, (Dec. 6, 2002), Annex 2(d). However, the CMC
Decision did not go as far as regarding the Secretariat's technical intervention as a
compulsory stage of the legislative process, but allowed MERCOSUR bodies to adopt
rules even without hearing the Secretariat's opinion. See supra ALEJANDRO PEROTrI &
DEISY VENTURA, note 96, at 13.
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other than normative acts strictu sensu, such as administrative decisions
relating to individuals101078 or political declarations with no intention to
create any legal effects.
Third, Decisions, Resolutions and Directives are not directly
applicable on Member States' domestic legal systems. For their entry
into force the following steps must be taken. First, each Member State
has to take all the necessary steps to incorporate them into its domestic
legal system and inform the MERCOSUR Administrative Secretariat
about the actions taken to this end. 10 9 It is for each Member State to
decide what kind of steps must be taken for the incorporation, whether it
is a purely administrative procedure or one that requires parliamentary
ratification. Once each Member State has informed the Secretariat about
the incorporation, the Secretariat will inform all Member States
accordingly. 1 0 The rule enters into force simultaneously for all Member
States thirty days after the Secretariat's communication.111 Before the
end of the thirty days period, Member States
must publish the rule in
1 12
question in their respective official journals.
The lack of direct applicability of MERCOSUR norms has become
the bottle neck of the legislative process, creating a serious compliance
problem. Indeed, only a small proportion of MERCOSUR secondary
rules have been duly incorporated into Member States' domestic legal
systems. 113 As it has been rightly pointed out, the lack of direct
applicability makes the effectiveness of decisions taken by MERCOSUR
political bodies dependent on domestic mechanisms and interests, which
often use this circumstance as an informal means of vetoing or blocking
their entry into force. 14 As a result, there is a huge implementation gap,
107. See, e.g., MERCOSUR CMC Decision 27/05, (Dec. 7, 2005) (designating the
Director of MERCOSUR Secretariat).
108. A case has already been made about the need to create a typology for the
different types of acts that can be adopted by the decision-making bodies. See supra
ALEJANDRO PEROTTI & DEISY VENTURA, note 96 at 25.
109. See POP, supra note 95, arts. 38, 40(1).
110. Id. at art. 40(2).
111. Id. at art. 40(3).
112. Id. at art. 40(3).
113. Between 1991 and September 2002, the CMC adopted 149 Decisions that
needed to be incorporated into Member States' domestic legal systems, out of which 44
(30%) were incorporated by the four Member States. During the same period, the CMG
adopted 604 Resolutions that needed to be incorporated into Member States' domestic
legal systems, out of which 224 (37 percent) were incorporated by the four Member
States. Between 1994 and September 2002 the MTC adopted 90 Directives that needed
to be incorporated into Member State's domestic legal systems, out of which 45 (50
percent) were incorporated by the four Member States. Secretaria Administrativa del
MERCOSUR, Las Normas de Derecho Originario y Derivado del MERCOSUR. Su
incorporaci6n a los Ordenes Juridicos de los Estados Partes (Sept. 26-27, 2002).
114. See Pedro da Motta Veiga, MERCOSUR's Institutionalization Agenda: The
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with a vast number of approved rules not incorporated into Member
States' domestic legal systems causing legal uncertainty and
undermining the credibility of the whole integration process.
To make matters more difficult, since private individuals cannot
rely on unincorporated secondary rules before national courts, the only
enforcement mechanism available to compel Member States to
incorporate MERCOSUR rules is the State to State dispute settlement
system based on ad-hoc arbitral procedures, which is not backed by
effective remedies.
A number of measures have been adopted to streamline the
incorporation process and minimize the implementation gap but the
problem persists.' 5 Proposals for introducing a directly applicable
system for MERCOSUR norms that do not require parliamentary
ratification are currently being negotiated but, so far, no formal decision
has been adopted. It is also expected that, once it is set up, the
MERCOSUR Parliament could play a more active role in speeding up
internal procedures for the entry into force of MERCOSUR norms that
require parliamentary approval.
B.

Impact of Secondary Legislation on the Liberalizationof Trade in
Services

This section examines how the main limitations of the MERCOSUR
legislative process, namely, the legal basis problem, the decision-making
problem and the compliance-enforcement problem have affected the
scope, purpose and quality of secondary legislation on services and,
where possible, puts forward some considerations on how could they be
solved.
1.

The Legal Basis Problem

MERCOSUR decision-making bodies have adopted secondary rules
in relation to education, energy, financial services, health, postal
services, professional services, telecommunications, tourism and
transport. Most rules are related to service sectors with comparatively
low trade relevance like education, health or postal services, or to traderelevant sectors but addressing very narrow and technical issues rather
than focusing on aspects of wider impact for the liberalization of trade.
For instance, although quite a few norms have been adopted on

Challenges of a Projectin Crisis 21 (INTAL-ITD Working Paper, July 2004).
115. See, e.g., MERCOSUR CMC Decision 55/00, (Dec. 15, 2000); MERCOSUR
CMC Decision 07/03 (June 18, 2003); MERCOSUR CMC Decision 22/04, (July 8,
2004).
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telecommunications, most of them are focused on the harmonization of
very specific technical regulations." 6 No matter how important the
harmonization of these technical issues may be, its impact on the opening
of telecom markets will be limited unless more fundamental regulatory
restrictions on the commercial presence of foreign telecom providers or
on the use of cross-border telecom services are sorted out. Similarly, in
the transport sector, out of the wide range of policies and regulations
affecting the conditions for transport services in Member States,
legislative action has been focused on particularly narrow issues such as
the harmonization of the conditions for the transport of hazardous
substances." 7 In the same way, there are norms harmonizing technical
regulations on the provision of very specific services like dialysis
services 1 8 or cleaning, disinfecting and pest control services.' 19
The service sectors regulated and the content of the rules confirm
the rather unfocused and eventful development of MERCOSUR
secondary legislation. The lack of treaty provisions clearly prescribing
the regulatory competence of MERCOSUR decision-making bodies and
the absence of a strategic legislative action plan may have influenced on
this outcome. An amendment of the Protocol of Ouro Preto, spelling out
more clearly in what areas to what extent and for what purposes can rulemaking bodies adopt norms, could help to harness
the development of
20
secondary legislation in a more efficient way.
The lack of a clear legislative strategy is also revealed by the varied
purposes underlying secondary rules on services. There are norms
directly aimed at eliminating trade barriers and promoting conditions of
fair competition standing along with norms pursuing non-trade
objectives. Typical examples of secondary rules used as an instrument
for the liberalization of trade include the CMC Decision on the
harmonization of the conditions of access for branches of insurance
undertakings,' 2' or the CMG Resolution on the harmonization of the
requirements for the authorization of road transport undertakings. 22 The
116. See, e.g., MERCOSUR CMG Resolution 25/94, (Aug. 3, 1994) (on the interface
of PDH digital transmission); MERCOSUR CMG Resolution 65/97, (Dec. 13, 1997) (on
the coordination of frequencies for mobile telephone services).
117. See, e.g., MERCOSUR CMC Decision 8/97, (Dec. 15, 1997); and MERCOSUR
CMC Decision 82/00, (Dec. 7, 2000).
118. See MERCOSUR CMG Resolution 42/00, (June 28, 2000).
119. See MERCOSUR CMG Resolution 54/02, (Nov. 28, 2002).
120. In this vein, again, it is worth looking at the European Union experience. For
instance, Article 52(2) of the EC Treaty lays down some guidelines for legislative action
stipulating that priority must be given to those services which directly affect production
costs or the liberalization of which helps to promote trade in goods. The European
Commission has a rich experience in drafting and implementing legislative actions plans.
121. See MERCOSUR CMC Decision 9/99, (Dec. 7, 1999).
122. See MERCOSUR CMG Resolution 58/94, (Apr. 11, 1994).

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:3

purpose of these norms is to facilitate cross-border trade by seeking to
establish a level playing field and avoiding the duplication of red tape.
By contrast, there is no shortage of examples of norms adopted for
non-trade purposes. The coordination of security and educational
policies, the protection of human rights, and cooperation agreements on
judicial affairs are just a few examples of areas not even remotely related
to the liberalization of trade where23MERCOSUR decision-making bodies
have been actively legislating on.'
In principle, there is nothing wrong with furthering cooperation in
non-trade areas through secondary legislation. One could also make a
case for the need to regulate on the protection of non-market interests
even at the expense of trade liberalization. But if this is the case, a
reformulation of the objectives of the Treaty of Asunci6n and the
Protocol of Ouro Preto and the role those instruments assign to the
market in the integration process would be necessary. Again, clear treaty
standards on what to regulate and for what purposes can contribute to
clarify the purposes of secondary legislation and its link with the overall
objectives of the integration process.
Most of the norms include an extremely succinct preamble, which
makes it more difficult to ascertain their purpose. In order to enhance the
transparency of the legislative practice it could be useful to request the
rule-making bodies to lay down more detailed preambles. Although
there is no specific procedure for the control of the validity of the norms,
a requirement for more specific recitals referring to the purposes of a
norm and its connection with the overall purposes of the Treaty of
Asunci6n, will help to identify the underlying values that are shaping the
integration process and the place that free trade occupies among them.
Another characteristic of MERCOSUR norms on services is that
they do not follow a single regulatory pattern. Some of them establish
memorandums of understandings124 or exchange of information and
cooperation agreements, 125 others provide for the minimum
harmonization of domestic regulations, 126 while a few of them provide
123.

See, e.g., MERCOSUR CMC Decision 40/00, (Dec. 15, 2000) (Cooperation

Agreement between Member States' Central Banks on the Exchange of Information for
the Prevention and Combat of Money Laundering); MERCOSUR CMC Decision 13/98,
(Dec. 10,1998) (approving a tri-annual plan and targets for the educational sector).
124. See MERCOSUR CMC Decision 57/93, (Sept. 24, 1993) (Guidelines on Energy
policies in MERCOSUR); MERCOSUR CMC Decision 10/98, (July 24, 1998)
(Memorandum of Understanding on Electric exchanges and Electric integration in
MERCOSUR); MERCOSUR CMC Decision 10/99, (Dec. 7, 1999) (Memorandum of
understanding relating to gas exchanges and gas integration in MERCOSUR).
125. See MERCOSUR CMC Decision 8/99, (Dec. 7, 1999) (Cooperation Agreement
between Supervisory Authorities of Insurance Companies).
126. See MERCOSUR CMG Resolution 8/93, (Jan. 17, 1994) (establishing minimum
common regulations for capital markets).
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for an exhaustive harmonization of domestic regulations.1 27 Each type of
norm impacts on the autonomy of domestic regulators in a different way.
While memorandums of understanding or cooperation agreements
simply encourage Member States to cooperate or exchange information
on specific issues, rules prescribing a detailed harmonization of domestic
regulations, involve a significant transfer of regulatory competence from
domestic regulatory agencies to MERCOSUR rule-making bodies on the
subject-matter regulated.
To some extent, the wide range of regulatory strategies followed by
MERCOSUR secondary legislation could be explained by differences in
the degree of disparity between domestic regulations or by particular
political economy factors underlying each service sector. It is not clear,
however, whether specific regulatory strategies are chosen according to a
particular rationale or they are just chosen randomly, without following
any particular logic. In any event, neither the Treaty of Asunci6n nor the
Protocol of Ouro Preto provides any guidance on the division of
competence between MERCOSUR rule-making bodies and domestic
Since the decision on the extent to which
regulatory agencies.
MERCOSUR rule-making bodies should interfere with the competence
of domestic regulatory agencies is a fine one, with technical and political
implications for the integration process, 128 it is vital to develop clear
parameters in this area.
2.

The Decision-Making Problem

As mentioned, any rule-making process must strike a balance
between political legitimacy and technical legitimacy. This balance is
particularly relevant for services, where the regulator normally faces
politically sensitive issues or highly technical regulatory challenges. A
legislative process led by diplomats, with little input from consultative
bodies representing the social and economic sectors and based on an allencompassing consensus rule leaves the regulator little maneuvering
room to find out the way to strike the balance between political
legitimacy and technical legitimacy. Nevertheless, MERCOSUR rulemaking bodies have tried some mechanisms to overcome these
127. See MERCOSUR CMG Resolution 38/04, (Nov. 26, 2004) (laying down quality
standards for the delivery of letters of up to 20 grams within specified areas).
128. For instance, a maximum harmonisation approach could provide an interesting
avenue to address the dual regulatory burden problem (i.e., trade barriers caused by an
overlap of domestic regulations), but, at the same time, it involves high transaction costs,
it can stifle regulatory competition and the fact that the rule-making process is led by
diplomats may also undermine the political legitimacy of the integration process, without
mentioning the compliance-enforcement difficulties faced by MERCOSUR secondary
legislation.
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limitations.
First, MERCOSUR rule-making bodies have tried to overcome
these limitations by contracting out part of the decision-making process
to private actors.
This mechanism has been tried by involving
professional associations in the development and implementation of
secondary rules applicable to Professional Services. CMC Decision
25/03 129 lays down some guidelines for the adoption of framework
agreements for the mutual recognition of professional bodies and
contains disciplines on the issuing of licenses for the provision of
temporary professional services. The objective is to harmonize the
regulatory requirements for the provision of professional services in
order to facilitate the movement of professionals across Member States
on a temporary basis. The norm involves the professional associations in
the development of the guidelines and disciplines, and in their
implementation by entrusting them the issuing of temporary licenses and
the supervision of the temporary provision of professional services.
Second, MERCOSUR rule-making bodies have tried to overcome
these limitations by relying on international standards. This mechanism
has been tried for the adoption of prudential regulations in the banking
and securities sector.' 30 In this case, instead of producing the regulations
themselves, MERCOSUR rule-making bodies rely on the standards
developed by specialized international organizations like the Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision. The advantage of this mechanism
is the adoption of state-of-the-art financial regulations produced by
highly specialized bodies, but at the same time, an excessive reliance on
"soft law" mostly shaped in light of the interests and needs of mature
financial markets may not necessarily match the technical needs of
developing financial markets and could undermine the political
legitimacy of the rule-making process.
Third, MERCOSUR rule-making bodies have tried to overcome
these limitations by delegating part of the decision-making process to
technical bodies. A growing number of sub-working groups, specialized

129. This norm acknowledges and takes on board the work carried out by the
MERCOSUR Commission for the Integration of Surveying, Agronomy, Architecture,
Geology and Engineering (in Spanish, Comisi6n para la Integraci6n de Ingenieria,
Agrimensura, Agronomia, Arquitectura, Geologia e Ingenieria para el MERCOSURCIAM), a regional body set up by national professional associations, which has been
working on the mutual recognition of professional qualifications. MERCOSUR CMC
Decision 25/03, (Dec. 16, 2003).
130. See MERCOSUR CMC Decision 10/93, (Jan. 17, 1994) (adopting the Basic
Rules and Principles on Banking Regulation and Supervision); MERCOSUR CMG
Resolution 1/96, (Apr. 19, 1996) (adopting the International Financial Standards on
debtor classification and credit risks); MERCOSUR CMG Resolution 20/01, (June 13,
2001) (adopting the Basle Rules on Transparency of Information of Financial Services).
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meetings and technical committees, provide technical support to the
CMG. A number of those technical bodies have competence on various
service sectors or on issues with direct relevance for trade in services, for
example, the Group on Services, sub-working groups on
communications, financial issues, transport, energy, health, investments,
e-commerce, and specialized meeting on tourism and on audiovisual and
cinematographic activities. Most of the secondary rules on services have
been originated by proposals put forward before the competent decisionmaking body by these technical bodies.
Technical bodies on specific service sectors could certainly make a
valuable input providing the specific knowledge necessary for regulating
complex issues. However, the growing number, great diversification
and, sometimes, overlapping mandate of these technical bodies, makes it
difficult to coordinate their actions with a view to formulate a coherent
liberalization policy for the various service sectors at issue. 13 1 Some
measures have been adopted to address this problem,1 32 but there is still
plenty of room for improving the way the technical supporting structure
operates, for instance, by making the coordination of work between the
different technical bodies more effective and avoiding overlapping
mandates.
3.

The Compliance-Enforcement Problem

The compliance-enforcement problem is one of the main limitations
faced by secondary legislation as an instrument for the liberalization of
trade. Like any other secondary rules, MERCOSUR norms on services
do not enter into force until all Member States have incorporated them
into their legal systems and in many cases Member States' have failed to
incorporate them, blocking de facto, the impact of regional policy
making. 133
One way to narrow the implementation gap of secondary rules could
be to undertake major institutional reforms aimed at transforming
MERCOSUR legal system into a community legal system, whereby
individuals could rely on MERCOSUR secondary legislation before
national courts against the Member State which has failed to incorporate
the secondary rule at stake.' 34 The involvement of domestic courts on
131. See Cecilia Pena & Ricardo Rozenberg, supra note 103, at 5.
132. See MERCOSUR CMG Resolution 5/01, (Apr. 26, 2001) (instructing the subworking groups on Communications, Financial Services, Transport, Energy and Mining,
Health and the Specialized Meeting on Tourism to identify and eliminate restrictive
measures to trade in services).
133.

See supra note 114.

134. A number of commentators have argued in favour of the "supranationalisation"
of the MERCOSUR institutional structure and the "communitisation" of MERCOSUR
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the enforcement of secondary rules is an attractive path, which enables
natural and legal persons to push the integration process forward.
However, there are serious obstacles in the way of deep institutional
reforms towards a community legal system.' 3 5 MERCOSUR has been
conceived as an intergovernmental model of integration based on
international law, allowing the Executive Power in each Member State to
hold tight control over the scope and pace of the integration process in
order to prevent any deviation from Member States' national interests,
and there is no sign that Member States would be ready to move away
from this scheme.
There are, however, alternative ways to increase compliance with
MERCOSUR secondary legislation within the limits of an
intergovernmental model operating under international law. As a general
principle, one of the best ways to ensure compliance is by producing
good quality rules. Rules that are technically flawed or which fail to
reflect a certain degree of consensus amongst those who attempt to
regulate face serious implementation difficulties.
In the first place, emphasis should be placed on improving the rulemaking process to ensure it produces good quality rules. MERCOSUR
decision-making bodies have tried a range of regulatory strategies, from
maximum harmonization of domestic regulations to less interventionist
strategies such as minimum harmonization or mere memorandums of
understandings. Reliance on international standards and mechanisms for
contracting out part of the decision-making process to non-governmental
bodies have also been tried. Despite the varieties of strategies tried, the
formula to strike the right balance between political legitimacy and
technical legitimacy is yet to be found. MERCOSUR decision-making
bodies must continue working on improving the quality of the rules they
adopt, finding the adequate regulatory strategy for each particular
challenge they face. In this vein, the European Union has amassed a rich
could be considered for inspiration
and varied regulatory practice that 136
and not for mechanical importation.
See, e.g., ELIZABETH ACCIOLY, MERCOSUR Y UNION EUROPEA.
ESTRUCTURA JURiDICO INSTITUCIONAL, (2ed. 1998); Heber Arbuet Vignali, Reflexiones
politicas,juridicasy epistemolgicas sobre el MERCOSUR, in ECONOMiA GLOBALIZADA
Y MERCOSUR, (Adda Lattuca & Miguel Ciuro Caldani, ed. 1998); MIGUEL ANGEL
legal system.

EKMEKDJIAN,

INTRODUCCI6N

AL

DERECHO

COMUNITARIO

LATINOAMERICANO

CON

ESPECIAL REFERENCIA AL MERCOSUR, (1994); Pablo Labandera Ipata, Aspectos
juridico-institucionalesque operan como freno para la integraci6n, in 2 REVISTA DE
DERECHO DEL MERCOSUR 63-78 (1998).
135.

There is no political will among Member States to move into a supranational

system, not to mention the scale of domestic reforms that would be necessary to adopt to
support an effective community legal system, including constitutional amendments.

136.

European

regulatory strategies

include, amongst others,

the Multi-level

Governance System for the European Securities Markets. See ALEXANDRE LAMFALUSSY,
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The enforcement stage should also be approached with an open
mind. So far, Member States have prioritized diplomatic negotiations
over rule-based enforcement mechanisms, limiting the use of the arbitral
dispute settlement system as an absolute last resort. However, there are
other formal and informal mechanisms for the enforcement of secondary
legislation that could be worth considering. First, the MTC should be
furnished with adequate resources to start performing the supervisory
functions assigned by the Protocol. 37 A procedure to notify the adoption
of new regulations affecting trade in services should be established and
the MTC should create a technical committee on trade in services to
comply with the mandate entrusted by the Protocol. The MERCOSUR
Secretariat could support the MTC to discharge its new functions by, for
instance, providing logistical support to compile and distribute
information about new regulations affecting trade in services.
Another possibility could be to implement a mechanism for
monitoring compliance using "name and shame" techniques such as
scoring boards illustrating Member States' records on the incorporation
of MERCOSUR rules. 138 In the same vein, MERCOSUR decisionmaking bodies could delegate monitoring tasks to the Secretariat, which
could produce technical reports relating to Member States' compliance
with MERCOSUR rules. Overall, a high degree of transparency is vital.
Open access to timed and accurate information about Member States'
compliance with MERCOSUR disciplines can trigger informal
enforcement actions which can be as effective as the formal ones.
In summary, secondary legislation is a vital instrument for the
liberalization of trade and in particular for the liberalization of trade in
services. 139 However, the deficiencies of MERCOSUR's legislative
ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE OF WISE MEN ON THE REGULATION OF

EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS, BRUSSELS (Feb.

15,

2001), http://ec.europa.eu/

internal -market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/fina-report-wise-men -en.pdf. The
Open Method of Coordination used in a host of policy areas, such as research/innovation,
information society, enterprise promotion, structural economic reform, and education and
training. See Susana Borrds & Kerstin Jacobson, The Open Method of Coordinationand

New Governance Patterns in the EU, 11 J. EUROPEAN PUB. POL'Y 185-208 (2004).
137.

See Protocol of Montevideo, supra note 6, art.XXIII.

138. This technique is widely used by the Commission of the European Communities
to reflect EU Member States' performance in the transposition of Directives.
139. Secondary legislation provides a flexible mechanism for adapting the regulatory
framework for trade in services to the permanent changes and innovations the service
sector is subject. As Ehlermann and Campogrande put it with respect to the EC's
services liberalization process: "It would have been inconceivable, even in a relatively
homogeneous group such as the Six, to construct from the outset a complete Community
system for trade in services, even if intended to be implemented in stages as was the
See Calus-Dieter Ehlermann & Gianluigi
liberalization of trade in goods."
Campogrande, Rules on Services in the EEC: A Model for Negotiating World- Wide

Rules? in

THE NEW GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS. LEGAL AND
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process have limited MERCOSUR decision-making bodies' capacity to
deliver timely and sound regulations to govern the integration of services
markets. As mentioned, there are some lines of action that could be
followed for improving the quality of MERCOSUR legislative process
without the need to undertake major institutional reforms, in particular,
the development of clear guidelines on what to regulate, to what extent
and for what purpose.
V.

Concluding Remarks

The process of liberalization of trade in services in MERCOSUR
must be understood in a context characterized by the increasing
tradability and growing importance of services for modern economies,
the complex nature of barriers to trade in services and the absence of
strong political support for the integration process.
The growing importance of services and the need to incorporate the
service sector into the integration process has prompted the adoption of a
number of measures. Currently, the MERCOSUR legal system includes
three main instruments for advancing the liberalization of trade in
services, namely, a number of general obligations and disciplines that
prescribe minimum standards of treatment for foreign service and service
providers; a Program of Liberalization based on the negotiation of
specific concessions on Market Access and National Treatment and a
rule-making process for the adoption of secondary legislation on specific
service sectors.
Although not perfect, these legal instruments could play a
significant role in tackling governmental measures and practices that
restrict foreign services' access to domestic markets or impair the
competitive relationship between foreign services vis Avis like domestic
services within the domestic market. It has been argued that there is
room for improving the efficacy of these instruments, without the need to
embark into major institutional reforms that would move MERCOSUR
away from its strictly intergovernmental character.
The disciplining effect of the Protocol's general obligations and
disciplines could be enhanced at least in two ways. First, by widening
the scope of application of the Market Access and National Treatment
standards through more ambitious rounds of negotiations. Second, by
adopting more rigorous disciplines beyond the non-discriminatory
standard that would provide a legal basis for a deeper securitization of
domestic regulations affecting trade in services, in particular, an
assessment of the proportionality of the means used for attaining the

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

490 (Emst-Ulrich Petersmann & Meinhard Hilfeds., 2d ed. 1987).
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objectives sought.
The legislative practice on services could be streamlined by the
introduction of clear standards on what to regulate, to what extent and for
what purposes and by adopting a carefully prepared legislative action
plan setting priorities for MERCOSUR rule-making bodies. The input
from technical bodies should be streamlined and the participation of the
consultative bodies in the rule-making process should be enhanced with a
view to produce technically sound rules backed by a broad political
consensus.
The enforcement of MERCOSUR disciplines should rely less on
diplomatic negotiations and more on rule-based procedures. In this vein,
efforts should be directed at enhancing the arbitral dispute settlement
system, but not be limited to it. The adoption of other enforcement
mechanisms should be explored, including the strengthening of the
supervisory role of the MTC and the adoption of mechanisms for
monitoring compliance based on "name and shame" techniques. More
generally, the standard of transparency on how MERCOSUR rules are
created and to what extent Member States observe them should be
increased sharply.
In the medium and long term, it is essential to enhance the training
of legal operators (regulators, lawyers, judges) in MERCOSUR law.
Finally, it has to be borne in mind that success always starts at
home, in particular when it comes to the liberalization of trade in
services. Considering the particularities of barriers to trade in services,
the first and most important step for the successful integration of service
markets is for each Member State to ensure that domestic rules are
applied in a transparent and impartial manner and that foreign service
providers have access to a due process for challenging protectionist
governmental measures and practices.

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:3

Annex
Table 1
Degree of Liberalization of Service Sectors by Member State(*)
July 2006
Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay
Business Services
Professional Services
Computer and related
services
Research and
development services
Real Estate services
Rental/Leasing services
without operators
Other Business Services

63%
75%

52%
75%

0%
75%

54%
75%

50%

42%

0%

50%

25%
44%

75%
50%

25%
38%

75%
50%

55%

54%

14%

48%

0%
75%
74%
25%

0%
75%
75%
0%

0%
0%
36%
0%

0%
50%
30%
11%

Constructing and
Related Engineering
Services

50%

50%

25%

50%

Distribution Services

75%

50%

38%

50%

Educational Services

21%

75%

35%

25%

Environmental Services

19%

13%

0%

10%

Financial Services
Insurance
Banking and other
Financial Services

24%
53%

20%
26%

7%
0%

41%
43%

50%

25%

25%

25%

Communication Services
Postal Services
Courier Services
Telecommunications
Audiovisual Services

Health Related and
Social Services
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Argentina

Brazil

Paraguay

Uruguay

Tourism and Travel
Related Sorvices

75%

25%

69%

75%

Recreational, Cultural, &

62%

15%

31%

15%

32%

29%

8%

25%

38%

30%

4%

18%

28%
30%
31%

10%
55%
55%

0%
0%
17%

0%
15%
0%

Sporting Services

Transport Services
Maritime Transport
Services
Internal Waterways
Transport Services

Air Transport Services
Rail Transport Services
Road Transport Services

(*) The degree of liberalization indicates the ratio of "NONE" entries on both the
Market Access and the National Treatment columns over the total number of possible
entries on Market Access and National Treatment for each service sector or sub-sector.
The information contained in this Table is based on Member States' schedules of specific
commitments approved by the VI Round of Negotiations, completed in July 2006.

